

**Table 2. Constitutional, Demographic, and Financial Indicators of Power by Religious Sect**

Religions Sect	Seats in Parliament	Percent of Total Population <sup>a</sup> (est. 1985)	Percent of Banking Capital in Top 15 Banks <sup>b</sup> as to		
			lending 1974	lending 1982	net worth 1982
Maronite	30	21			
Greek Orthodox	11	6			
Other Christian	13	8			
Total Christian	54	35	62	47	32
Sunni	20	25			
Shiite	19	36			
Druze	6	4			
Total non-Christian	45	65	18	36	33
Confessionally indeterminate			20	17	35
Totals	99	100	100	100	100

*Sources:* Chamie 1981, 25, 85; Association des Banques du Liban 1974; Baz 1984, 215, 220.

<sup>a</sup>Estimated growth rates for each sect were projected from the 1932 census. Palestinian immigrants, some of whom became Lebanese citizens, are not included in these estimates of the Lebanese population.

<sup>b</sup>The allocations of capital among the top 15 Lebanese creditor banks of 1974 are calculated from capital book values, whereas the capital of the 1982 creditors includes other reserves and loan provisions as well. Only capital and reserves, not provisions, are counted for the 15 banks having the greatest net worth.

tions, indicated by parliamentary seats, and the demographic realities, estimated impressionistically (the last Lebanese census was undertaken in 1932, and subsequent administrative projections make political but no demographic sense)—without statistically valid margins of error—in light of recent research into the fertility of the respective communities.<sup>3</sup> The results are summarized in Table 2. Comparisons between the first and second columns suggest the extent to which the Maronites, Greek Orthodox, and other Christian communities are overrepresented in the Lebanese parliament at the expense of the Sunni community and especially at the expense of the Shiite community.

The top fifteen Lebanese-owned creditor banks can also be scrutinized, still more tentatively, with respect to their sectarian ownership in 1974 and in 1982. The third column of Table 2 indicates that

Christians controlled 62% of the total capital of these 15 banks in 1974, whereas the Muslims and Druze had only 18%, the rest belonging to banks that seemed confessionally indeterminate.<sup>3</sup> With only three exceptions, the same banks occupied the top 15 positions in 1982 (fourth column), but their ownership had changed. New capital injections tended to be Sunni Muslim, mainly from the Arabian Gulf, but many of the large lenders were still inadequately capitalized. A fifth column in Table 2 represents a different, only partially overlapping, set of leading banks, the 15 in 1982 that were the most highly capitalized. In this set the share of Christian equity is further diminished, yet these are the banks that may be waiting in the wings to rescue overextended ones. In the event of peace, a competitive shake-out of Lebanon's overcrowded banking system is to be expected. Comparisons between columns